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Abstract—While the public claim concern for their privacy,
they frequently appear to overlook it. This disparity between
concern and behaviour is known as the Privacy Paradox. Such
issues are particularly prevalent on wearable devices. These
products can store personal data, such as text messages and
contact details. However, owners rarely use protective features.
Educational games can be effective in encouraging changes in
behaviour. Therefore, we developed the first privacy game for
(Android) Wear OS watches. 10 participants used smartwatches
for two months, allowing their high-level settings to be monitored.
Five individuals were randomly assigned to our treatment group,
and they played a dynamically-customised privacy-themed game.
To minimise confounding variables, the other five received the
same app but lacking the privacy topic. The treatment group
improved their protection, with their usage of screen locks
significantly increasing (p = 0.043). In contrast, 80% of the
control group continued to never restrict their settings. After the
posttest phase, we evaluated behavioural rationale through semi-
structured interviews. Privacy concerns became more nuanced
in the treatment group, with opinions aligning with behaviour.
Actions appeared influenced primarily by three factors: conve-
nience, privacy salience and data sensitivity. This is the first
smartwatch game to encourage privacy-protective behaviour.
Index Terms—Privacy, game, smartwatch, behavior, wearable,
education
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Study Motivation
The public claim to be concerned about privacy, as sug-
gested by a range of polls and surveys (Morar Consulting,
2016; Pike, Kelledy, & Gelnaw, 2017). However, we frequently
exhibit behaviour which places our data at risk (Beresford,
Ku¨bler, & Preibusch, 2012; Felt et al., 2012). This disparity
between claimed concern and empirical action is known as
the Privacy Paradox (Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007). The
situation often arises through a lack of awareness (Deuker,
2009). This poses a particular risk to wearables, which are
both novel and unfamiliar (Williams, Nurse, & Creese, 2017).
Smartwatches offer exciting functionality, providing interac-
tive apps and online connectivity. They can also store a variety
of personal data, from text messages to contact details (Do,
Martini, & Choo, 2017). Despite this, users rarely use available
settings to protect their privacy (Udoh & Alkharashi, 2016).
This has led to the Privacy Paradox being prevalent in this
environment (Williams et al., 2017).
Previous work has suggested that this issue can be mit-
igated by increasing awareness (Deuker, 2009). Therefore,
many studies have sought to educate users on privacy matters
(Kelley, Bresee, Cranor, & Reeder, 2009; He´lou, Guandouz,
& Aı¨meur, 2012). Unfortunately, highlighting a problem is
often not sufficient to change behaviour (Bada, Sasse, &
Nurse, 2015). Since privacy is rarely a primary goal (Hughes-
Roberts & Furnell, 2015), individuals might lack the moti-
vation to protect their data. If we hope to incentivise pro-
tection, privacy should be aligned with user wants (Dolan,
Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 2010). Rather than
mandating compliance, we can then highlight the empowering
aspects of protection. Serious games embed incentives within
interactivity, using positive reinforcement to instil knowledge
(Kumar, 2013). Such apps have succeeded in phishing training
(Sheng, Magnien, & Kumaraguru, 2007) and network defence
(Irvine, Thompson, & Allen, 2005). However, privacy games
have never been developed for smartwatches. In previous
work (under review), we constructed and evaluated an online
prototype. Through a 504-person survey, we found that pro-
tective actions could be encouraged. Therefore, to empirically
assess behaviour, we develop and evaluate the first smartwatch
privacy game.
B. Background and Related Work
Privacy and awareness. Privacy is a nebulous topic, en-
compassing confidentiality, anonymity and autonomy (Solove,
2008). However, since we target technological behaviour, we
scope our focus to these interactions. Therefore, we consider
informational privacy: “the interest an individual has in con-
trolling, or at least significantly influencing, the handling of
data about themselves” (Clarke, 1999).
Polls repeatedly suggest that the public care about their
privacy (Pike et al., 2017; Morar Consulting, 2016). A 2017
survey found 84% of US consumers were worried about their
data, with 70% stating their concerns have increased (Pike et
al., 2017). Despite these assertions, we rarely act to protect our
information. We ignore permissions (Felt et al., 2012), skim
policies (Glanville, 2018) and settle for lax default settings
(Bonneau & Preibusch, 2010). This attitude-behaviour gap has
been labelled the Privacy Paradox (Norberg et al., 2007).
We define the Privacy Paradox as the “discrepancy between
the expressed concern and the actual behavior of users”
(Barth & de Jong, 2017). Due to its popularity, it has been
deconstructed in many previous studies. Veltri and Ivchenko
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(2017) explored the influence of cognitive scarcity. Through
an experiment with 969 users, they discovered that fatigue
encouraged disclosure. They used this factor to partially justify
the Privacy Paradox. Hallam and Zanella (2017) adopted the
lens of Construal Level Theory, which studies whether con-
cepts are considered abstract or concrete (Trope & Liberman,
2010). If issues are hypothetical or temporally distant, as
often the case with privacy, they are frequently deemed to
be abstract. The authors describe how this ‘psychological
distance’ tends to lead to the topic lacking salience. As a
result, they concluded that concerns have little influence on
protective behaviour. Our work also considers the influence of
privacy salience. While the above studies discuss the topic, we
actively seek to mitigate the Privacy Paradox.
Research suggests that increasing awareness should address
the Privacy Paradox. Deuker (2009) found a concern-behaviour
disparity existed due to bounded rationality, incomplete infor-
mation and psychological variables. When describing bounded
rationality, he highlighted that “users’ capabilities in pro-
cessing information and drawing the right conclusions are
restricted by nature”. Since individuals fail to process the
technical details, they tend to underestimate the risks of
privacy invasion. Through building awareness, he believed
that both bounded rationality and incomplete information
could be addressed. Po¨tzsch (2009) saw two solutions to
the disparity: align concern to behaviour or behaviour to
concern. By highlighting privacy risk, individuals should be
more likely to act. Indeed, Bartsch and Dienlin (2016) found
that knowledge can increase the chance of protective action.
However, informed individuals must also have the motivation
to put that knowledge into practice. While these researchers
theorised wise solutions, we evaluate the success of a privacy
intervention.
Jackson and Wang (2018) successfully mitigated the Pri-
vacy Paradox on mobile phones. They used customised no-
tifications, with charts highlighting the discrepancy between
a user’s attitude and their app permissions. Attitudes were
evaluated through a concern questionnaire at the start of the
study. Based on their selected permissions, the system then
predicted their degree of privacy risk. Through an online
simulation, the authors found that the disparity decreased after
these notifications were viewed. This is encouraging, and we
adopt personalised challenges within our games. However, the
Privacy Paradox was studied on mobile phones at a single
point in time. In contrast, we evaluate smartwatch interactions
over a two-month period.
Privacy behaviour change. Awareness can highlight the
existence of a particular risk. However, this is often insufficient
to change privacy behaviour (Bada et al., 2015). Sasse et al.
(2007) recommended a three-stage approach: raise awareness,
give education and provide training. In this manner, individuals
have an opportunity to practice and refine their behaviour.
Finally, even if users possess the knowledge, they must be
incentivised to act (Bada et al., 2015). Our game, introduced
in Section III, seeks to implement all these approaches.
We explore privacy-protective behaviour through the lens
of Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1983). This
model “postulates the three crucial components of a fear
appeal to be (a) the magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted
event; (b) the probability of that event’s occurrence; and (c)
the efficacy of a protective response” (Rogers, 1975). It seeks
to deconstruct why individuals do (or do not) use protection
(Rogers, 1983). Therefore, it appeared relevant to our efforts at
behaviour change. It is comprised of two primary components:
threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The former is informed
by the severity and vulnerability of a risk. The rewards of
functionality are also taken into account. For the latter, self-
efficacy and response efficacy is considered. This is balanced
against the costs of protection. Our games sought to influence
these components to encourage privacy.
We also considered the Theory of Reasoned Action1
(Fishbein, 1979), but this model does not recognise constraints
on action (Briggs, Jeske, & Coventry, 2017). It is not deemed
appropriate for skilled tasks (Liska, 1984), and privacy protec-
tion appears to require skill. While we investigated the Theory
of Planned Behaviour2 (Ajzen, 1991), this fails to account
for susceptibility or response efficacy (P. Norman & Conner,
1996). In contrast, PMT aligns well with privacy and has been
recommended for security behaviour change (Briggs et al.,
2017).
In non-wearable environments, education has prompted pro-
tection. Albayram et al. (2017) encouraged screen lock usage
on smartphones. In their 228-person study, they divided their
participants between a treatment group and a control group.
The former watched an educational video, whereas the latter
did not. Both groups reported their smartphone actions in
pretest and posttest. The treatment group reported improved
behaviour, suggesting the video was persuasive. Since we
evaluate the efficacy of an intervention, we also adopt a
pretest-posttest two-group design. However, rather than using
smartphone self-reports, we study smartwatches empirically.
Albayram et al. (2017) later explored whether videos can en-
courage the use of Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). Through
a 2x2x2 design, they generated and evaluated eight videos.
Their content varied on whether risk, self-efficacy and con-
tingency were included. When the first two components were
highlighted in the videos, participants were found to adopt
2FA. Both risk and self-efficacy are considered within PMT,
and we also use the theory to encourage alterations. However,
while Albayram et al. (2017) used Amazon Mechanical Turk,
we analyse participants through a field study. Our in-person
approach delivers several advantages. Since our behaviour is
empirical rather than self-reported, it should be less prone
to falsehood (Fielding, 2006). With participants using a real
smartwatch in a native environment, our findings should also
have external validity. Finally, although our in-person approach
limited our sample size, it supported rationale extraction
through rich interviews.
‘Nudging’ has become a popular approach to encourage
protection (Wisniewski, Knijnenburg, & Lipford, 2016). Wang
1The Theory of Reasoned Action is based on “the proposition that an
individual’s behavior is determined by the individual’s behavioral intention
to perform that behavior” (Chang, 1998)
2The Theory of Planned Behaviour “states that the proximal determinant
of behaviour is the intention to act. The intention, in turn, is influenced by the
attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norm, and perceived behavioural
control” (Hardeman et al., 2002)
2
et al. (2014) augmented Facebook to highlight the audience
of a person’s posts. Through their six-week trial, they found
unintended disclosures were decreased. Although temporarily
influential, behaviour can revert when nudges are removed
(Bruyneel & Dewitte, 2016). This approach differs from
techniques within serious games. Nudging modifies the choice
architecture to encourage certain decisions. In contrast, serious
games seek to instil lessons through education and positive
reinforcement (Connolly, Boyle, MacArthur, & Hainey, 2012).
Since intrinsic motivation can be highly persuasive (Ryan &
Deci, 2000), the latter approach might prove more persistent.
Behaviour change games. Serious games can be defined as
“any form of interactive computer-based game software...that
has been developed with the intention to be more than
entertainment” (Ritterfeld, Cody, & Vorderer, 2009). Such
tools have been highly successful, often considered more
persuasive than direct training (Wouters, Van Nimwegen, Van
Oostendorp, & Van Der Spek, 2013). In non-smartwatch
environments, security has been frequently addressed. Anti-
Phishing Phil (Sheng et al., 2007) challenged users to identify
fraudulent URLs. After playing an aquatic game, players
were better able to avoid phishing campaigns. We differ by
targeting smartwatches, but adopt similar Learning Science
principles. For example, we implement reflection (Donovan,
Bransford, & Pellegrino, 1999), where players contemplate
their learning experience. We also include story-based agents
by using Non-Player Characters to guide the user through our
narrative (Moreno, Mayer, Spires, & Lester, 2001). Finally, we
use the conceptual-procedural principle by augmenting high-
level information with specific instructions (Rittle-Johnson
& Koedinger, 2002). These techniques sought to encourage
protective behaviour.
Immaculacy (Suknot, Chavez, Rackley, & Kelley, 2014) is
a proposed privacy game, in which the user faces dystopian
scenarios. Characters progress through challenges by under-
taking privacy-protective actions. This encourages reflection
on behaviour, and we adopt a similar approach. Vaidya et
al. (2014) considered interactive techniques to teach privacy.
Since privacy is inherently complex, they recommended that
scenarios be used. We implement scenario-based challenges,
developing the first smartwatch privacy game.
Smartwatch behaviour. Although wearables have existed
for decades, smartwatches have gained recent popularity. They
can be defined as “an electronic wristwatch that is able to
perform many of the functions of a smartphone” (Collins
English Dictionary, 2017). The environment differs greatly
from other contexts, particularly when concerning the topic
of privacy. Internet-of-Things (IoT) products (defined as be-
longing to a “global network interconnecting smart objects by
means of extended Internet technologies” (Miorandi, Sicari,
Pellegrini, & Chlamtac, 2012)) have been criticised for lacking
usability (Williams, Nurse, & Creese, 2016). Smartwatches
have small screens and few buttons, with this constraining
the use of protective settings (Horcher, 2015; Benbunan-Fich,
2017). The devices are also unfamiliar and therefore their
navigation is less likely to be understood (Williams et al.,
2017). Furthermore, they can possess highly-sensitive data
(Al-Sharrah, Salman, & Ahmad, 2018), while often having
great vulnerability (Hewlett Packard Enterprise, 2014). Due to
the novelty and idiosyncrasy of this environment, behavioural
studies might uncover new insights.
Pizza et al. (2016) evaluated behaviour for 34 days, with
their participants possessing wearable cameras. They found
smartwatches were most often used as timepieces, though they
also provided notifications. Jeong et al. (2017) undertook a
203-day longitudinal study, collecting data on 50 participants.
They analysed wear, but never considered security or privacy.
Indeed, there have been no empirical studies on smartwatch
privacy. Our analysis offers a rare glimpse into how these
settings are used.
Smartwatches are a challenging interface for games, since
they possess small screens and few buttons. Casano et al.
(2016) evaluated an app entitled ‘Estimate It!’, which sought
to teach measurement and geometry. The game was ported
to a Tizen OS watch, and users were engaged in gameplay.
Design requirements and usability guidelines have also been
created for this environment (Li, 2017; Jime´nez Vargas, 2016).
However, educational games remain greatly underexplored.
Before undertaking this research, we developed an online
prototype of our smartwatch game (under review). Through
this app, we evaluated behaviour change and qualitative ra-
tionale. To achieve this, we recruited 504 smartwatch users
through a crowdsourcing platform. The treatment half played
the prototype, which included privacy questions and chal-
lenges. The control participants did not interact with an
application. In pretest and posttest, we solicited concern and
behaviour through an online survey. Whereas the Privacy
Paradox was mitigated in the treatment group, control actions
failed to change. While this study was encouraging, the game
was emulated and behaviour was self-reported. To empirically
evaluate the matter, we now construct and evaluate the first
smartwatch privacy game.
II. METHOD
A. Recruitment
Sampling process. 10 Huawei Watch 2 devices were pur-
chased for this study. Since we monitored all participants over
the same two-month period (to minimise extraneous variables),
the size of our sample was practically limited. Individuals were
loaned an expensive device, and as such there was a security
risk. Therefore, in compliance with our university’s ethical
requirements, we recruited from the institution’s students. This
demographic offers decent external validity, since smartwatch
owners tend to be young and educated (Desarnauts, 2016).
Recruitment. To participate, individuals were required to
fulfil three criteria. They had to be full-time university stu-
dents, and therefore accountable for their device. They also
needed to be 18 years or older, so they could provide informed
consent. Finally, they had to possess a modern Android
smartphone, to allow their watch to be configured. Of those
eligible applicants, we sought to prioritise diversity. Rather
than compiling a white British sample, we included a range
of nationalities. Privacy is inherently cultural (Alashoor, Keil,
Liu, & Smith, 2015), with research suggesting Asian societies
do less to protect personal data (Huang & Bashir, 2016).
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Therefore, we explored whether European students would use
greater protection than those from Asian nations. We also
selected individuals from a variety of degree specialisms.
We felt this would be more-representative of the public than
choosing technologists.
To recruit, flyers were affixed to notice boards across the
halls of the university. Emails were also sent to mailing list
curators, who could forward the messages if they wished.
Participants were fully informed of, and consented to, the
monitoring of their watch settings. In addition to the privacy-
relevant data, we also received approval to track font size,
screen brightness and battery level. This disguised the purpose
of our study, while also ensuring high ethical standards.
B. Experimental Structure
Overview. Our longitudinal study was divided into three
distinct phases: pretest, gameplay and posttest. The exper-
imental structure is shown in Fig 1. In a 18-day pretest
phase, we monitored the baseline concerns and behaviour of
our 10 participants. During a 16-day gameplay phase, these
individuals were randomly divided into a treatment group
and a control group. Group allocation was truly random,
with the process undertaken before study commencement. We
considered matching, but thought pure randomisation would
reflect the external environment. Fortunately, our groups still
appeared well-matched on demographics.
Fig. 1. Experimental structure
The treatment group (n = 5) received a customised privacy
game, including challenges to refine behaviour. To minimise
confounding variables, the control group (n = 5) received
the same app, but without the privacy theme. Their game
concerned general smartwatch use, such as using gestures
and adjusting screen brightness. We originally considered
having the control group play no game. However, we were
concerned that treatment participants might adjust behaviour
purely due to study interaction. Therefore, to reduce bias from
the Hawthorne Effect (Adair, 1984), both groups received a
game. All participants played their game over a five-day and
four-day period, with a one-week gap in the middle. Such
two-stage approaches can help to construct mental models
(Mayer, Mathias, & Wetzell, 2002). After these periods were
completed, we ended with an 18-day posttest phase. This
allowed us to explore whether actions had changed.
We decided against including control variables in our study.
We could have considered users’ smartwatch familiarity, but
all participants lacked prior experience. By collecting non-
watch privacy opinions, we might have identified baseline
concerns. However, since we sought to disguise the topic (to
avoid priming), we decided against this approach.
Pretest. In total, we monitored concerns and behaviour over
a 52-day period. We were limited to this span due to the term
lengths of our student participants. On day one, 10 individuals
were given a Wear OS smartwatch. Once configuration was
complete, the monitoring app was installed on each device.
This (ethically-approved) service logged settings every five
minutes, with details outlined in Subsection II-D. At the end
of the phase, we distributed a concern questionnaire to each
participant. Its queries can be found in the appendices as Table
VII. We considered soliciting these opinions at the start of the
study. However, users might be unfamiliar with smartwatches
and therefore unable to provide informed responses. As none
of the participants had used such a device before (as revealed
in our posttest interviews), our notion was validated. We also
sought to assess concern directly before gameplay, since we
wished to explore our games’ influence. At the end of the
pretest phase, individuals had used their smartwatches for 18
days. Therefore, they should have now been able to provide
informed opinions.
Gameplay. While users completed the questionnaire, we in-
stalled one of two games on their watches. The treatment group
received a privacy-themed game, which sought to encourage
protection. The control group were given an app with identical
gameplay, but concerning a different theme. Rather than the
challenges (highlighted below) targeting privacy, they related
to general smartwatch usage (e.g., adjusting screen brightness).
Since both groups received interactive games, we restricted the
influence of extraneous variables. Users were instructed to play
the games three times per day for 10 minutes each time. At the
end of this 16-day phase, participants completed an evaluation
questionnaire. These questions can be found in Table IX of
the appendices. This sought to inform future refinements to
the games. The questions did not concern privacy, since we
did not wish to prime the topic before the posttest phase.
Posttest. To prevent further gameplay influencing be-
haviour, the apps were uninstalled from the watches. For the
final 18 days, we continued to monitor privacy behaviour. At
the end, we distributed identical concern questionnaires to
pretest. This enabled analysis of whether opinions changed
as the study progressed. Since these forms were completed 18
days after gameplay, we doubt concerns were unfairly primed.
Finally, we conducted semi-structured interviews to explore
behavioural rationale. The questions were all open-ended and
can be found in Table VIII of the appendices. Smartwatches
were then reset while users received their compensation. They
were each compensated with a £40 voucher and entry into a
£70 draw. They were also debriefed on our privacy focus, as
this was disguised in forms and recruitment. With concerns
and behaviour collected, we could now analyse the Privacy
Paradox.
C. Threat Model
As will be described, we evaluated privacy concerns through
hypothetical scenarios. For these concerns to be assessed fairly,
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we must define a reasonable threat model.
All individuals made use of a Wear OS smartwatch. This
watch contains a number of apps, with some developed by
companies other than Google/Huawei. Apps are constrained by
permissions, allowing data access to be restricted. Data which
is read is often shared (potentially anonymised or aggregated)
with external parties (Schneier, 2015). The watches can access
GPS, offering location-customised functionality. While this
provides navigational benefits, the device’s current location is
accessed (Ashbrook & Starner, 2003). These watches are also
small, expensive, and consumer-oriented. Like Android smart-
phones, this places them at a reasonable risk of loss or theft
(Matthews, 2016). Indeed, their “size and portability makes
them easy to steal” (Baggili, Oduro, Anthony, Breitinger, &
McGee, 2015). Therefore, if a threat is encountered, it would
likely come from app companies or petty criminals.
D. Protective Features and Concern Scenarios
Selection. To gauge privacy concern, we were required to
solicit personal opinions. However, privacy is highly contex-
tual (Nissenbaum, 2009), and this can challenge a simple
rating (Paine, Reips, Stieger, Joinson, & Buchanan, 2007). For
example, ‘very concerned’ means little when it is divorced
from the particular situation. Context is also important when
comparing concerns against behaviour. Trepte et al. (2014)
were critical of works that juxtaposed abstract opinions against
concrete actions. To compare these factors, it is wise to situate
them within the same context. We adapted the design of Lee
et al.’s influential work (2016), by requesting responses to
hypothetical scenarios. This supports an analysis grounded
within the smartwatch environment. To enable a fair evalu-
ation, scenarios were selected through three criteria:
1) The issue must be feasible and part of our threat model.
2) The situation should be comprehensible to our sample.
3) Most importantly, there should be a direct correspon-
dence between scenario and privacy-protective tools.
Responses were made on a five-point Likert Scale, also
adapted from Lee et al. (2016), which ranged from Indifferent
to Very Concerned. As highlighted earlier, these questions
can be found in Table VII of the appendices. Individuals
then provided a qualitative justification for each answer.
Since concerns can be inflated when insufficiently considered
(Baek, 2014), these queries provided a pause for reflection.
When analysing behaviour, it was important to consider the
available protective tools. In Wear OS environments, three
features appeared particularly relevant. These comprised of:
app permissions, GPS disabling and screen locks. The settings
are outlined below, alongside their respective concern scenario.
Permissions. Apps3 provide useful functions to the smart-
watch owner. To provide these services, they often access
personal data. While this access is legitimate, details are com-
monly traded with third parties (Schneier, 2015). Fortunately,
as on smartphones, privacy permissions can restrict access.
When applications cannot read details, they cannot share them
with partners. To gauge concern, we asked users how they
3Wear OS apps can be standalone watch applications, and do not require
a smartphone equivalent.
would feel if their data was accessed. We also asked how
they would react if data was shared with others. If a person
is opposed, they can reduce their risk through permissions.
GPS. GPS can support great functionality, such as naviga-
tion and fitness tracking. To provide these features, a satellite
geolocates the smartwatch. By its very nature, this allows the
position of a device to be monitored (Ashbrook & Starner,
2003). If an individual wants to limit this, they can easily
disable their GPS. Then, when functionality is required, it can
be briefly re-enabled. To evaluate concerns, we asked users
how they would feel if their position was monitored. We also
asked how they would react if this data was shared with others.
If a person fears this, disabling GPS can reduce the risk.
Screen locks. Passcodes are well-known barriers, and have
been suggested to deter smartphone theft (Consumer Reports,
2014). Since the Watch OS interface is similar to Android,
this deterrent could apply to watches. Smartwatches are small,
expensive and popular. As a result, they have been deemed a
feasible target for theft (Baggili et al., 2015). Through using
a screen lock, personal data is better-protected. To gauge
concerns, we asked users how they would feel if their missing
device was accessed. We also solicited reactions to their apps
being used by a stranger. If users are concerned about physical
access, a screen lock is a simple solution.
E. Research Questions
We explore whether the Privacy Paradox can be mitigated
through an educational game. To achieve this, we must com-
pare concerns and behaviour in pretest and posttest. Further-
more, we must judge our treatment group results against those
of our control group. Therefore, it is crucial that we first define
our study metrics.
Metrics. Concerns are evaluated based on reactions to
the above scenarios. Since our Likert data is ordinal, it is
conventional to avoid means. However, if questions consider
the same topic, it is deemed acceptable to aggregate the scores
(G. Norman, 2010; Carifio & Perla, 2008). By taking means
of these responses, we receive location scores, stranger scores
and app scores. The Cronbach alpha values for these question
pairs were 0.837, 0.204 and 0.631, respectively (Cronbach,
1951). Since the second alpha was particularly low, we report
responses to the two ‘stranger’ scenarios (stranger app access
and stranger app use) separately.
To evaluate behaviour, we developed metrics to summarise
participant activity. For the GPS score, we calculated the per-
centage of recordings (taken every five minutes) in which the
feature was enabled. Similarly, for the lock score, we analysed
the percentage of logs in which a lock was present. When
assessing permissions, we chose to consider the context of the
application. Some permissions were deemed to be innocuous,
such as waking the screen or increasing the volume. We made
this judgement by considering the personal data that might
be accessed. Two permissions concerned particularly private
details: precise location and text message contents. We anal-
ysed these elements since such details could support privacy
invasions (Creese, Goldsmith, Nurse, & Phillips, 2012). The
permission score comprised the average acceptance percentage
of these two permissions.
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Research questions. We both monitor 52 days of empirical
behaviour and conduct 10 in-depth interviews. Through this
quantity of data, we seek to address the following questions:
1) Do smartwatch users take action to protect their data?
If not, this has implications for smartwatch risk and
interface design.
2) In smartwatch environments, does a Privacy Paradox
appear to be prevalent? If so, users might place their
personal data at risk.
3) Can the smartwatch game encourage privacy-protective
behaviour? If so, such apps could offer an interactive
and low-cost complement to awareness campaigns.
4) What factors influence smartwatch behaviour? If we can
understand behavioural rationale, we might be better-
placed to design interventions.
III. GAME DESIGN AND RATIONALE
We now move forward to discuss the design of our two
smartwatch games. Most attention will be given to the privacy
version, since this sought to encourage protective behaviour.
A YouTube video of the game can be found at: https://
goo.gl/K7DVfL.
A. Game Narrative and Mechanics
Overview. Both games challenged users to navigate across
a maze-like map. The privacy version can be found below in
Figure 2. The player starts at their house and then must traverse
four levels to reach the shops. En route, they collect coins to
increase their score. When the game ends (or is completed),
this score is ranked on a competitive leaderboard.
During their journey, users encounter two types of Non-
Player Character (NPC): ‘villagers’ and ‘thieves’. Villagers
ask functionality questions and reward correct answers with
points. For example, a player might be asked, “How can
I prevent apps accessing contact details?”, and select the
“Revoke contacts permission” response.
Thieves block the user’s path and trigger functionality
challenges. In these challenges, characters must configure a
settings menu before their health expires. For example, a
player might be tasked to enable a screen lock. Success is
rewarded by additional coins, while failure ends the game.
If the final level is completed on normal difficulty, extra
modes are unlocked. All aforementioned components are iden-
tical on both games. The only differences were that the privacy
app’s challenges/questions related to protective features.
Challenges. The general version concerned generic non-
privacy smartwatch features. These included adjusting font
size, changing screen brightness and configuring alarm vol-
ume. In our concern questionnaires, we included decoy ques-
tions relating to these settings. Therefore, the purpose of our
study was further disguised. The privacy game focused on the
three protective approaches: restricting permissions, disabling
GPS and enabling a screen lock. These were divided into 14
challenges, shown below in Table I.
In seeking to highlight each participant’s risk exposure,
these challenges were dynamically customised around user
behaviour. This was achieved through reading the recent
Fig. 2. Smartwatch privacy game. Left: SAM playing the game in ‘Morning’
mode. Right: BOB facing a customised challenge in ‘Night’ mode.
TABLE I
PRIVACY GAME CHALLENGES: SET TASKS IN ITALICS.
Level One (2 Challenges: 1 Set, 1/3 Random)
Disable GPS Enable a screen lock pattern
Check app permissions Revoke contacts permissions
Level Two (3 Challenges: 1 Set, 2/3 Remaining)
Enable a screen lock pattern Check app permissions
Revoke contacts permissions Revoke audio permissions
Level Three (4 Challenges: 1 Set, 3/3 Random Order)
Enable a screen lock PIN Revoke location permissions
Check system app permissions Disable GPS & location perms
Level Four (5 Challenges: 5/5 Set Order)
Revoke SMS permissions Enable a screen lock password
Revoke sensors permissions Lock pattern, GPS, location perms
Uninstall application
log files of the monitoring app. Based on GPS, screen
lock, apps installed and app permissions, we contextualised
the tasks. For example, a participant might grant AC-
CESS FINE LOCATION permissions to their Uber app. If
this had occurred, location challenges (in the game) would
be customised with these details. This design followed the
influential work of Harbach et al. (2014), who used a similar
approach on smartphones. Since our contextualisation was
dynamic, the game adjusted to reflect recent user behaviour.
This provided an educational feedback loop to encourage
protection (Kiili, 2005).
B. Behaviour Change Principles
The games were designed with educational techniques from
psychology (Garg & Camp, 2012), learning science (Quinn,
2005) and HCI (Richards, Thompson, & Graham, 2014). They
could be defined as ‘operative games’, since they “leverage
knowledge gained from the study of games or play to exert
control upon the world such as encouraging exercise or
learning” (Carter, Downs, Nansen, & Harrop, 2014).
Personalisation. When participants first open the app, they
assign themselves a three-digit name. Since customisation
contributes to immersion (Annetta, Murray, Laird, & Bohr,
2006), individuals should continue in a more-retentive manner.
They then personalise their character, toggling gender, hair
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colour and skin colour. These avatars tend to further increase
immersion (Annetta & Holmes, 2006), and might lead to the
receptive ‘flow’ state (Kiili, 2005).
Practice. Game challenges required the configuration of a
settings menu. Through completing tasks, participants learned
directly-applicable skills. Rather than adjusting the real menu,
we implemented a simulated interface (found in Figure 3).
This allowed us to provide on-screen hints, found to offer
further education (Woolf, 2010). It also enabled users to
experiment in a safe environment, without being forced to
change their own settings. Challenges were time-pressured,
encouraging players to remember the menu layout. This sought
to trigger ‘pleasurable frustration’, where users enjoy a fun but
challenging task (Gee, 2004).
Fig. 3. Smartwatch privacy challenges. Left: DISABLE GPS challenge in
progress. Right: DISABLE GPS failure screen, describing the consequences.
Education. Since we wished to enhance privacy knowledge,
we included education within the application. When a new
game is started, individuals can watch a brief slideshow. The
presentation highlights protective approaches and the potential
consequences of inaction. In the control group game, the
slides concerned general elements of functionality. Again, by
including similar features in both apps, we sought to minimise
the influence of extraneous variables.
Contextualisation. We selected an accessible real-world
narrative: that of going to the shops. Although we considered
more exciting scenarios, we took guidance from the literature
(Maldonado et al., 2005) and selected a relatable situation.
Since understanding is enhanced by aligning physical and vir-
tual risks (Garg & Camp, 2012), we also matched challenges to
possible real-world situations. For example, the character faces
a challenge when they are near their (gameplay) house. This
task requires GPS disabling, since their home location is being
‘tracked’. In a later level, a thief and villager are adjacent to
each other. Since questions could be overheard, the challenge
concerns microphone eavesdropping. By relating risks to real
situations, participants might consider threats in the future.
Principles. To encourage protective behaviour, we imple-
mented the four learning science principles (goal-oriented,
challenging, contextual and interactive) (Quinn, 2005). We
achieved this through (1) privacy challenges, (2) difficulty
modes, (3) dynamic customisation and (4) rich interactivity.
The six principles of educational game design were also
implemented (Annetta, 2010). This was done through avatars
(unique identity), rich narrative (immersion), high responsive-
ness (interactivity), difficulties (increased complexity), chal-
lenges (informed teaching), and feedback (instructional).
Behaviour change. The above paragraphs outline our de-
sign techniques but they do not specify our behaviour change
mechanism. Primarily, we sought to a) appeal to the availabil-
ity heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and b) increase user
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). This heuristic describes how “a
person evaluates the ... probability of events by availability,
i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). By increasing the salience of
privacy, we wished to enhance the perceived risk of data
infractions. Through self-efficacy, participants should gain
confidence to put new skills into action. In concert, this seeks
to increase behavioural control. In an attempt to increase
salience, we use gameplay feedback, informative questions and
interactive challenges.
Even when individuals recognise the risks, they need knowl-
edge to protect themselves. Through our educational game,
we seek to deliver information and provide an opportunity for
practice. This should increase individuals’ self-efficacy: the
confidence that they have in their own expertise. Aligning
with Protection Motivation Theory, if users possess self-
efficacy and appreciate the risks, they should be more likely
to take action (Rogers, 1983). We hope this encourages our
participants to change their behaviour to a protective state.
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Participants and Techniques
Participants. 10 participants used smartwatches for two
months. Although four came from the UK, we also had
individuals from Ireland, Italy, Russia, Mexico, Singapore and
the US. While we suspected that concerns and behaviour
might differ by culture, this was not found. A larger sample is
required to evaluate the influence of this factor. Eight of the
users were male, while two were female. Smartwatch users
have been disproportionately male and young (NPD Connected
Intelligence, 2014), and this trend appears to continue4. Since
many also tend to be well-educated (Desarnauts, 2016), our
sample has some validity. None of our participants had ever
used or owned a smartwatch before. This inexperience should
limit the influence from prior familiarity. As mature smart-
watches are relatively recent5, an inexperienced sample should
be externally valid.
Quantitative techniques. Since our sample size was small,
we used non-parametric measures for our behavioural compar-
isons (Siegal, 1956). To significance test independent groups,
we selected the Mann-Whitney U Test (1947). If the two
samples were related, we chose the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Test (1945). We required p < 0.05 for significance, though its
likelihood is limited by our small sample. We used Cohen’s
d for effect sizes, with 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 representing small,
medium and large, respectively (1977). This metric is less
affected by sample size (Cohen, 1977), and gives an indication
of the game’s influence. We use x¯ for means, as is standard
notation.
4www.statista.com/statistics/739398/us-wearable-penetration-by-age/
5www.wareable.com/smartwatches/smartwatch-timeline-history-watches
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We did not undertake significance testing when comparing
concerns or opinions. Since these scores only ranged from 1/5
to 5/5, significance was unlikely in a 10-person sample. We
also chose not to apply significance testing to our rationale
proportions. As these metrics were based on thematic coding,
we preferred to use qualitative analyses.
Qualitative techniques. Through our questionnaires and
interviews, we collected a large quantity of qualitative data.
This enabled a rare exploration of the privacy rationale of
smartwatch behaviour. To ensure a robust evaluation, we
undertook best practice through inductive thematic analysis
(Ritchie, Spencer, & O’Connor, 2003).
First, all data was formatted in a consistent manner. For
our interviews, the researcher undertook verbatim transcrip-
tion. This approach provides the most detailed account of
a discussion (MacLean, Meyer, & Estable, 2004), further
enhancing our validity. We moved on to label recurring topics
and concepts. This was undertaken iteratively, seeking to
establish consistency between similar replies. Once labelling
began to converge, we divided our topics into subtopics.
Through this process, we developed conceptual frameworks.
These indices then served as our coding frames. Once coding
was completed, we selected vivid examples (Braun & Clarke,
2006) of rich participant quotes. These are excerpts which we
deemed to exemplify a qualitative theme. To select examples,
we reviewed those quotes categorised within each topic. If
an excerpt was deemed to explain a matter with clarity, it
was presented as a vivid example. Through this approach,
we aimed to include qualitative description alongside our
quantitative findings. These examples are included throughout
this section to illustrate user opinions.
Validation. To maximise our validity, we followed four
best-practice procedures. Firstly, since we explored rationale
through both questionnaires and interviews, we triangulated
our findings (Flick, 2004). Secondly, our interviews were
analysed through multiple coding (Patton, 1999). A second
researcher, not familiar with with the authors’ topic, also
coded the transcripts. We analysed consistency by compar-
ing the theme distributions through ‘proportion agreement’
(Morrissey, 1974). We selected this method over Cohen’s
kappa (Cohen, 1960) for two reasons. Firstly, there were a
large number of themes, reducing the risk that matching is due
to chance. Secondly, since responses often mentioned multiple
themes, kappa is not appropriate (Cohen, 1960). The matching
accuracy was 83.4%, suggesting that raters frequently agreed
on the categorisation.
Thirdly, we did not seek to hide deviant cases. Where
opinions could not be conveniently grouped, distinct themes
were retained. Finally, we used respondent validation to verify
our understanding (Brink, 1991). Each participant was sent
their interview transcript and their assigned codes. They were
asked to evaluate the accuracy and to suggest refinements.
Fortunately, 100% of the sample agreed with our decisions.
Therefore, we believe our findings adequately encapsulate our
participants’ rationale.
B. Pretest Findings
Our pretest concern questionnaires were completed 18 days
into the study. This ensured that the participants were familiar
with their device, but not in possession of training.
Opinions. Before addressing concerns, the questionnaire
assessed general opinions. However, we reserve discussion
of these to the posttest section. Importantly, we included
an instructional manipulation check within the questions
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). In Question
9, participants were asked to indicate their attentiveness by
replying ‘Strongly Disagree’. This query did not serve other
purposes and was not related to privacy. Since all individuals
answered correctly, the reliability of our responses was deemed
enhanced (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).
We then assessed privacy concerns, analysing reactions to
violation scenarios. In addition to our described incidents, we
included six decoy questions. Through this technique, privacy
priming should have been mitigated. The proportion of those
at least ‘concerned’ is illustrated below in Table II, while the
questions can be found in Table VII of the appendices.
TABLE II
PRETEST PRIVACY CONCERNS
Q Concern Scenario Concerned (%)
16 GPS: Location tracking 50
25 GPS: Location sharing 80
19 Screen locks: Stranger access 80
21 Screen locks: Stranger app usage 70
18 Permissions: App data collection 90
23 Permissions: App data sharing 80
GPS. Our participants expressed some opposition to loca-
tion tracking, with 50% indicating their concern. However,
opinions varied, with another 30% being quite indifferent.
When assessing these scenarios, we also considered the par-
ticipants’ rationale. 16 justifications were given, and while
37.5% expressed concerns, 37.5% were dependent on the
situation. For example, 18.8% claimed their reaction depended
on whether the tracking was optional. If the tracking could be
disabled, as GPS can be, they would be less worried. However,
for location data to be protected, intentions must turn into
action.
To directly illustrate participant opinions, we display vivid
examples below (Braun & Clarke, 2006). We also report the
participant ID of the cited individual. Users A-E were in the
treatment group, while F-J were control participants. At this
pretest stage, group membership was irrelevant.
“I want to be able to decide when I can be tracked” (#C).
The second concern scenario, considering location sharing,
faced strong opposition. For this incident, 80% were concerned
and nobody expressed indifference. We then considered qual-
itative justifications, with 21 comments provided. The vast
majority expressed concern (85.7%), with most individuals
objecting to the principle (23.8%). Many also thought this
was illegal (14.3%), but it might be consented through privacy
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policies. If individuals are truly opposed to this sharing, access
can be limited by disabling GPS.
“I would very much feel as though my privacy was
invaded” (#A).
Whereas concerns were reported, behaviour was collected in
our smartwatch logs. At this pretest stage, all 10 users had their
GPS enabled. Indeed, not a single person had adjusted this
setting. This implies that their location was accessible for the
first 18 days. When considering RQ1, it appears that protective
actions are rarely taken. Since the public are unlikely to be
receive training, this presents a worrying baseline. We hope
that through our game, the issue will gain salience.
Screen locks. When considering unauthorised access, par-
ticipants were worried. 50% indicated their strong opposition,
while not a single respondent was indifferent. This suggests
that users generally reject this intrusion. 15 justifications were
given, with 60% of these fearing great damage. Concerns were
primarily driven by the security risk (20%) and the importance
of personal data (20%). This suggests that our participants
place value on their smartwatch. Two individuals were less
concerned, with one believing that that their password would
protect them. If protective features are enabled, the privacy
risk might be mitigated.
“I don’t want a stranger to know my whereabouts” (#G).
Participants expressed similar concerns over their apps
being used. 70% were in opposition, with only one person
expressing indifference. This suggests that application access
is strongly rejected. On this occasion, 14 comments were
provided for justification. 64.3% of these feared great damage,
with data access being the most common concern (28.6%).
This is understandable, since apps can contain personal details.
Only one participant was unconcerned, and they believed their
apps were not sensitive (7.1%). However, if app usage is
feared, a screen lock might be appropriate.
“They could cause issues through contact and they could
gain my details” (#E).
Fortunately, four participants had enabled a screen lock.
Since games had not yet been played, this suggests the
feature is well-known. This might be due to the prevalence
of smartphone PINs and patterns. The other six participants
had never used a lock. Despite their inaction, they still claimed
concern over the scenarios. In these situations, it is likely that
the setting was never noticed. Considering RQ1, this implies
that protective action is far from constant.
Permissions. We next gauged concern towards an app
accessing data. Respondents were strongly in opposition, with
90% disliking this situation. When considering the justifica-
tions, 16 different comments were given. While 25% depended
on particular details, 62.5% expressed strong concern. Many
objected to the access on principle (25%), whether or not it
posed a risk. Individuals might not act to prevent an issue, but
oppose it at an ideological level. In such cases, a disparity is
often found between concern and behaviour.
“I would want them to respect my privacy” (#E).
When considering data sharing, 80% opposed the incident.
Our users appear to reject these practices, despite them being
commonly found (Schneier, 2015). We then considered the
qualitative justifications, with 17 comments provided. 58.8%
of these expressed concern, compared to only 17.6% with little
worries. As before, the most popular objection was purely on
principle (23.5%). These individuals found this data sharing
to be invasive. If they wish to limit the content, they could
choose to change their permissions.
“I value my online privacy” (#F).
To assess empirical behaviour, we analysed the pretest logs.
Throughout this 18-day period, not a single participant had
restricted their permissions. In fact, these settings had been
loosened by 9/10 users. Furthermore, two installed additional
apps with sensitive permissions. Since the public are unlikely
to receive education, this presents a worrying baseline.
RQ1. In our first research question, we explored whether
smartwatch users protect their data. Although screen locks
were used by some, 60% neglected the feature. GPS was
used constantly by all individuals, enabling locations to be
identified. In the case of permissions, settings were loosened
rather than tightened. Based on these results, smartwatch users
rarely behave in a protective manner.
RQ2. Our second research question explored whether the
Privacy Paradox was common in this environment. To illustrate
the degree of concern, the mean scores are displayed below
in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Pretest mean privacy concerns.
Although location tracking was not strongly opposed, shar-
ing provoked negative responses. This did not encourage
any participants to disable their GPS. Our respondents also
rejected both unauthorised access and app usage. While some
mitigated the risk through passwords, others expressed similar
concern. Finally, users appeared to strongly disagree with apps
accessing or sharing data. However, they chose to loosen their
permissions. Based on these results, concerns and behaviour
appear misaligned. Our smartwatch game seeks to mitigate
this issue.
C. Gameplay Opinions
Evaluations. At the end of the gameplay phase, participants
completed an evaluation questionnaire. This form can be found
in Table IX within the appendices. It did not concern the topic
of privacy, since we did not wish to prime posttest behaviour.
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We first solicited agreement with statements through Likert
Scale questions. Users were asked whether they assessed
the games as enjoyable, usable, educational and challenging,
respectively. Across our sample, 60% expressed that they en-
joyed the games. While it is encouraging that most participants
were pleased, we would hope to increase this percentage in
future iterations. The agreement level was equal in each group
(60%), suggesting the privacy theme did not detract from
enjoyment. 70% deemed the apps to be usable; promising
since usability can encourage retention (Annetta, 2010). In
this case, 80% agreed in the control group, compared to 60%
in the treatment group. As will be outlined in Section IV-F,
some of the privacy menus were challenging to navigate. This
might have contributed to the decreased percentage.
Since we wished to inform participants, we hoped the
apps were considered educational. Fortunately, all respon-
dents agreed with the statement. However, differences existed
between our groups. Whereas 80% of control participants
were in strong agreement, this was matched by 20% of the
treatment group. Surprisingly, this suggests that the generic
game was considered more educational. This opinion might
have emerged for two reasons. Firstly, since the privacy app
only concentrated on the three protective features, its content
was narrower. Secondly, as evidenced in our final Likert-Scale
question, privacy tasks were found more challenging. Whereas
generic tasks were deemed simple (100%), nobody thought the
same of treatment challenges (0%). This suggests that privacy
is a more-complex topic, and might explain why protective
settings are frequently overlooked.
Opinions. We then proceeded to extract opinions through
qualitative questions. Their open-ended responses were coded
through the thematic analysis highlighted in Subsection IV-A.
Firstly, we asked individuals what they most liked about the
game. Usability was most praised, with this contributing to
41.2% of responses. The ease of interaction was particularly
appreciated (23.5%), suggesting our game was simple to play.
This is encouraging, since usability has been found to en-
courage retention (Annetta, 2010). When discussing dislikes,
participants mentioned 14 factors. The most-frequent com-
plaint was that the games were repetitive (28.6%). This was
partially intentional, since repetition is a standard approach
to ingrain knowledge (Franzwa, Tang, & Johnson, 2013). In
future implementations, greater randomness might make the
issue less apparent.
When we asked for suggested improvements, 19 comments
were submitted. 57.9% were in favour of extending the game,
with 26.3% requesting additional ‘challenges’. This might
suggest that users saw feasibility in our approach. While our
challenges currently concern installed programs, we could
add tasks based on app installation. Through these participant
responses, we can refine our games for future interaction.
D. Posttest Concerns
Users returned their smartwatches at the end of the posttest
phase. They then completed final surveys, identical in design
to the pretest forms. This allowed fair examination of whether
opinions had changed. Since the games had not been played
for almost three weeks, they should not prime privacy. Further-
more, our purpose should be disguised by the decoy questions.
Due to the small sample sizes, we do not include p-values in
our below discussion. For ordinal comparisons in a 10-person
sample, significance is highly unlikely. As an overview, the
pretest-posttest concern proportions (the percentage of those
at least responding ‘concerned’) are presented below in Table
III. The final columns highlight the pretest-posttest change.
TABLE III
PRETEST-POSTTEST PRIVACY CONCERNS
TMT: TREATMENT GROUP, CNT: CONTROL GROUP
Pretest (%) Posttest (%) Change (%)
Concern Scenario
Tmt Cnt Tmt Cnt Tmt Cnt
Location tracking 20 80 60 60 +40 -20
Location sharing 60 100 40 100 -20 0
Stranger access 60 100 100 60 +40 -40
Stranger app usage 100 40 80 80 -20 +40
App data collection 100 100 60 100 -40 0
App data sharing 80 80 60 80 -20 0
Opinions. In this section, we explored our participants’
privacy perceptions. To assess awareness, we asked whether
personal data could be read by apps. While agreement de-
creased in the control group (from x¯ = 4.8 to 4.6), it increased
in the treatment group (from x¯ = 4.4 to 4.8). We then solicited
their confidence in their own understanding. As expected,
treatment users appeared to have greater self-efficacy than the
other group (x¯ = 4.6 vs 3.8).
In our third question, participants were asked whether an
app might threaten smartwatch data. Whereas the treatment
group perceived a threat (x¯ = 4.8), controls appeared to
lack this knowledge (x¯ = 3.4). Although our sample size
impedes significance, the privacy game might have enhanced
understanding. All users again succeeded in the instructional
manipulation check. This implies that responses were made in
an engaged manner (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).
Location. When considering location tracking, both groups
became more worried. Concerns were now slightly less con-
tingent, and instead focused on the principle of violation (3/10
participants). Users also began to consider targeted advertising
and the way their data might be used (2/10). Treatment
individuals might have learned about specific risks from their
game. Again, representative quotes (with participant ID and
group) are shown below.
Firstly, we solicited reactions to location tracking. 60% were
now concerned at the issue (up from 50%), suggesting one
individual might have learned the risk. Although responses
are more varied than for some incidents, monitoring appears to
provoke some unease. 18 justifications were given, with 55.6%
expressing concern. Treatment reactions were now less de-
pendent, with some opposing the incident on principle (20%).
Control participants feared the leak risk (25%) but cared less
if it was optional (25%). With respondents expressing greater
concern, we hope this contributes to GPS disabling.
“There still runs a risk that there might be data leakage”,
(#H, Control).
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We also analysed reactions to location sharing. Concerns
appeared to have altered greatly since the pretest stage. The
control group were still opposed, with all respondents being
‘Very Concerned’. Surprisingly, only two treatment partici-
pants acted in the same manner (40%). Indeed, their concern
appeared to decrease as the study progressed. To investigate
the rationale, we analysed our 15 qualitative responses. In
the control group, individuals feared a security risk (33.3%).
One participant was also worried because they felt uninformed
(11.1%). Three responses were indifferent, with all these
coming from treatment users. Participant D doubted their risk
since they disabled GPS. This report was true, and it implies
that behaviour aligned with concerns.
“They can only do so if I have my location turned on, and
as I only use this feature occasionally it wouldn’t bother
me too much”, (#B, Treatment).
Stranger access. When considering unauthorised access,
both groups showed strong opposition. This matched the
pretest reaction, suggesting that this incident is still rejected.
If so, more screen locks should have been enabled. While
concerns were strong, the rationale differed between our
groups. For treatment participants, the access to personal data
was most troubling (40%). They also opposed the security risk
that these details could pose (20%). In contrast, several in the
control group doubted their sensitivity (28.6%). If they had
played the privacy game, perhaps they would have knowledge
of their risk exposure.
“Not sure they’d get much out of it” (#I, Control).
Both groups continued to oppose unauthorised app use.
80% expressed concern at the scenario, with the distribution
of responses being identical. This was greater than the 70%
in pretest, suggesting the risk might have gained salience.
While both groups were predominantly concerned, their qual-
itative rationale differed. Our treatment participants named
specific issues, such as impersonation (33.3%) or identity
theft (22.2%). The control group were more general, and two
individuals expressed dependent concerns. Since our privacy
game sought to highlight risk, users might have learned of
specific threats.
“Identity theft is my worst fear” (#A, Treatment).
App access. Concerns differed more considerably when
discussing data collection. All the control group were wor-
ried, with 40% giving strong responses. In contrast, 40% of
treatment participants supplied a neutral reply. Through the 15
justifications, explored what encouraged these views. Control
users were worried about data selling (16.7%) and the risk of
leakage (16.7%). Treatment participants were alone in offering
mitigative views. One expressed that data could be collected
through other means (11.1%). While true, permissions provide
a rare opportunity to limit access.
“Companies already have means of getting so not too
concerned” (#D, Treatment).
For the final scenario, we assessed reactions to data sharing.
As in the previous incident, the treatment group appeared to
lose concern. While 80% of control participants were worried,
the others appeared less concerned. To explore why, we anal-
ysed the 16 qualitative responses. In the control group, targeted
advertising was the main issue (37.5%). For treatment users,
reactions were dependent on other factors. Their concerns
were nuanced, based on whether data was sensitive (16.7%)
or aggregated (16.7%). Rather than scaring users, the privacy
game might support informed judgements. Hopefully, they also
learned how to adjust their permissions.
“I wouldn’t mind if ... it was information that wasn’t too
specific” (#B, Treatment).
Summary. For good reason, we hesitate from judging a
small sample. However, treatment concern appeared to de-
crease in 4/6 cases. Individuals might now have a greater
recognition of how they are acting. If protection is used more
frequently, concerns and behaviour might realign.
When assessing responses critically, there might be several
reasons for this pattern. Firstly, if initial responses were strong,
posttest answers could indicate regression to the mean. This
might be due to the random responses of an unengaged sample.
We doubt randomness was the primary factor, since users were
engaged frequently within study elements. Secondly, treatment
participants might have deemed decreased concern to be a
study objective. Therefore, their answers were influenced by
a response bias. However, through decoy questions at all
stages, we sought to disguise the purpose of our study. Finally,
the ‘fear of the unknown’ might have magnified the pretest
concerns. When smartwatches then became familiar, this effect
may have decreased. We believe that this factor is most likely
to have proved influential. Whereas initial responses might
have been vague, posttest concerns were informed by be-
havioural experience. Therefore, concern-behaviour alignment
might still be an outcome.
E. Posttest Behaviour
For our third research question (RQ3), we explored whether
the game could encourage protective behaviour. To assess this,
we monitored the smartwatches for 52 days. If activity differs
between pretest and posttest, our app might be influential.
A per-participant comparison can be found in Table IV.
Increases in protection are highlighted in green, while deterio-
rations are in red. Table V illustrates the mean daily behaviour
throughout the study. The columns denote time periods, as
shown in Figure 1, while the rows denote participants’ actions.
GPS. In our treatment group, the behaviour change was
dramatic. Across the five individuals, GPS usage decreased
by an average of 40%. Our small sample impeded significance
(p = 0.157), but the ‘very large’ effect size (d = 1.461) was
promising (Sawilowsky, 2009). Based on a desired power
of 0.8, a sample of at least 14 would be required. While
Participants B and D used the service in the pretest phase,
they ceased usage during the gameplay session. Furthermore,
they did not re-enable GPS throughout the remainder of the
study. This implies that users successfully learned protection.
This comes in contrast to the control group, where every
participant allowed the service. Usage did not adjust even
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TABLE IV
PRETEST-POSTTEST DIFFERENCE IN PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOUR
# GPS Screen Lock Permissions
A - - +1.1%
B -100% +99.9% -22%
C - - +21.5%
D -100% +13.7% +2.4%
T
R
E
AT
M
E
N
T
E - +100% -
F - - -
G - - -
H - - +0.1%
I - - +1.1%C
O
N
T
R
O
L
J - - +0.4
slightly between their pretest and posttest phases (p = 1.0).
Indeed, GPS was not disabled once over the 52 days. This
suggests that, without training, users will not protect them-
selves. It also implies that behaviour was not biased by our
questionnaires.
Screen locks. For the treatment group, screen lock usage
increased by 42.7%. This change was significant (Z = -2.023,
p = 0.043, d = 0.733), with the medium effect size suggesting
the game was persuasive. Participants B and E did not use a
password during the first 18 days. However, within 10 minutes
of playing the game, both enabled the feature.
In the control group, Participant J continued to use a
password from the pretest stage. None of the other individuals
used the feature even once. As such, behaviour barely changed
as the study progressed (p = 0.317). Again, this demonstrates
that protection will be rarely used without encouragement.
Permissions. Interestingly, permission acceptance did not
differ greatly for either group. In our treatment group (p =
0.5), the acceptance rate was stable for A, D and E. B might
have responded to the game, decreasing their percentage by
22%. However, C continued their exploration, increasing their
rate by 21.5%. Users often spoke of balancing privacy against
functionality, and these views are explored in the next section.
In the control group (p = 0.068), behaviour remained stable
for all individuals. This suggests that their game did not
influence privacy protection. Across the 52 days, no control
participants revoked a single permission. Their permission
scores only differed based on the apps they installed. This fur-
ther implies that protective behaviour is rare on smartwatches.
RQ3. Table V illustrates protective behaviour throughout
the study. As shown, control-group actions are static before,
during and after gameplay. Indeed, actions appeared finalised
from Day 2 of the study. Throughout the other 50 days, the
shading continues to be orange. Therefore, it appears that the
generic game had no influence on behaviour. This ensures that
it served as an appropriate control to the privacy app.
For the treatment group, protection was rare in the pretest
period. Although some participants used the features, their
usage was inconsistent. However, once the gameplay phase
begins, the chart becomes predominantly green and yellow.
This shading remains throughout the rest of the study. As the
privacy game lost salience, behaviour did not appear to relapse.
This suggests that this app was successful in encouraging
protection. As concerns decreased in the treatment group,
opinions and behaviour appeared to realign.
F. Interview Findings
After the posttest questionnaires were completed, we con-
cluded the study with interviews. The questions can be found
in Table VIII of the appendices. These semi-structured discus-
sions served three purposes. Firstly, they allowed us to gauge
general opinions of the study. Secondly, we could compare the
privacy knowledge of our two groups. Finally, we explored the
behavioural rationale of each participant. As an overview, the
responses of our groups can be found below in Table VI. This
illustrates how the posttest capabilities of participants appeared
to differ after the gameplay phase. The details of the responses
are highlighted within the following paragraphs.
TABLE VI
PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW RESULTS
Q Characteristic Treatment (%) Control (%)
10 Knew protective feature 100 40
Disable GPS 60 20
Lock screen 40 0
Restrict permissions 60 20
Would defend privacy 100 60
11 Against location tracking 100 0
12 Against app data collection 100 0
13 Against unauthorised access 100 60
Demonstrated ability 100 100
14 Disabling GPS 100 60
15 Locking screen 80 80
16 Restricting permissions 80 80
Demonstrated confidence 100 40
14 Disabling GPS 100 20
15 Restricting permissions 100 40
16 Locking screen 80 0
General. We asked users whether they felt influenced by
the background monitoring app. None of our 10 participants
believed it had any effect. While this does not ensure external
validity, it increases the reliability of our findings.
“I just used it as I would normally” (#A, Treatment).
With the study requiring long-term interaction, we were
interested in why our users chose to participate. All 10 were
curious to trial a smartwatch, with two also appreciating
research. Only two mentioned the voucher compensation,
suggesting participation was primarily driven by genuine in-
terest. Since our demographics were not dissimilar to the user
population (NPD Connected Intelligence, 2014; Desarnauts,
2016), we should have external validity.
“I was about to buy a new one [smartwatch] so that was
the perfect moment” (#J, Control).
Before introducing the topic of privacy, we asked partici-
pants if they learned anything as the study progressed. This
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TABLE V
LONGITUDINAL PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOUR: (G)PS USAGE, (S)CREEN LOCK USAGE AND (P)ERMISSIONS ACCEPTANCE.
GPS: ≤ 49% GREEN AND ≥ 50% ORANGE. SCREEN LOCK: ≤ 49% ORANGE AND ≥ 50% GREEN.
PERMISSIONS: ≤ 33% GREEN, 34% - 66% YELLOW AND ≥ 67% ORANGE.
# PRETEST PERIOD GAME PAUSE GAME POSTTEST PERIOD
G
SA
P
G
SB
P
G
SC
P
G
SD
P
G
S
T
R
E
AT
M
E
N
T
G
R
O
U
P
E
P
G
SF
P
G
SG
P
G
SH
P
G
SI
P
G
S
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
G
R
O
U
P
J
P
assessed gameplay retention, as the apps had not been used
for 18 days. Privacy was highlighted by 60% of the treatment
group. Since they also praised the game, it might have been
educational. The control group were similarly influenced, with
60% mentioning their app. However, to truly examine whether
users are informed, we must test their knowledge.
“I think there was a couple of privacy settings that, through
the game, I picked up” (#B, Treatment).
Privacy awareness. To compare degrees of privacy aware-
ness, we asked users how they believed their data could
be accessed. All of our treatment group provided accurate
descriptions (100%). They also highlighted the risk of user
accounts (12.5%) and fraudulent apps (5.0%). Since their
game outlined privacy threats, they might have learned of
their vulnerability. In contrast, only 40% of controls knew app
practices, with the others blaming irrelevant technologies.
“Through some app that you allow them to track your
location”, (#E, Treatment).
We then asked users how they could protect their privacy.
As shown in Table VI, all treatment participants knew a
beneficial action (100%). 40% named screen locks, 60% cited
permissions and 60% would disable GPS. Even if they choose
not to act, they should be able to make informed decisions. In
the control group, only 40% named a single setting. Many
justifications highlighted that they were unsure (13.3%) or
unconcerned (13.3%). If individuals lack awareness, their data
might be placed at risk.
“I’d probably start by going through the list of apps and
seeing what permissions were useless”, (#A, Treatment).
To further assess knowledge, we asked participants how
they could defend against the scenarios. These comprised of:
location tracking, unauthorised access and app data collection.
If individuals know defences, they can act in response to their
concerns. In the first incident, all the treatment group knew
to disable their GPS (100%). However, none of the control
participants could list a technique (0%). When considering
unauthorised access, the former group also performed well.
All the users mentioned screen locks, whether PIN (60%) or
pattern (40%). This was compared with 60% of the controls,
with several highlighting they felt unsure. Finally, we con-
sidered defences against data collection. The treatment group
outlined permissions (100%) and app deletion (60%). No
control participants knew of permissions, even after 52 days
of interaction (0%). When comparing the groups, it appears as
if the privacy game was educational. Unfortunately, untrained
users seem not to seek out protection.
“...I’m not using Google Maps right now, so I don’t need
to have the location enabled for it” (#D - TMT).
Ability. While these responses gave us confidence, we
wished to test knowledge empirically. Individuals might know
of settings but be unable to use them. Therefore, we asked
users to demonstrate the three protective features. By talking
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aloud, we could ascertain both their route and their certainty.
Users were given a watch and asked to disable the GPS.
The treatment group found this simple, with all five navigating
directly (100%). In contrast, only 60% of control participants
could find the settings. Another 40% claimed to have never
checked the feature, indicating their lack of exploration. In-
dividuals were then asked to adjust their permissions. These
settings were better-understood, with 8/10 navigating straight
to the menu. However, while the treatment group were all
certain (100%), 60% of the others were learning en route.
“Disable GPS you said? Go down to Connectivity, Loca-
tion, off. Done”, (#A, Treatment).
When requesting password usage, individuals had greater
difficulty. Although 7/10 followed a direct path, no control
participants expressed certainty (0%). This appeared due to
the difficulty in categorising Screen Lock in a particular menu.
After 52 days of interaction, it is concerning that privacy
settings cause such confusion. This further demonstrates the
importance of educational tools.
“Another thing I haven’t done” (#I, Control).
G. What factors influence smartwatch behaviour?
RQ4. Finally, we consider the responses to our PMT
questions. Based on the frequency of themes, we outline the
factors that appear most influential. Through exploring user
rationale, we address our final research question.
PMT factors. In terms of factors, participants generally
possessed good self-efficacy. Most also believed configuration
was easy, even if some knowledge was required. And although
many in the control group doubted watch protection, settings
did not seem to be the issue.
The most influential factors appeared to be the threat com-
ponents. Firstly, most users had a balanced view of severity. If
data access was consented and rewarded, many were satisfied.
This helps explain why protection was so often ignored.
Secondly, the control group failed to perceive risk. Unlike
treatment participants, they had not learned the value of their
data. Finally, and most influentially, users received rewards
from smartwatch apps. Since settings can impede functionality,
permissions were often blindly accepted. It was only after
gameplay that participants reflected on data access.
Rationale. Based on interview responses, three issues pri-
marily influenced decisions: sensitivity, salience and conve-
nience. When individuals knew that their data was valuable,
they considered protection. However, since watch details were
often deemed innocuous, settings were not explored. Similarly,
when privacy was not visible, participants often forgot the
concept. If they felt at risk or noticed consequences, protection
regained its relevance. Most crucially, users tended to weigh
convenience against privacy. Smartwatches are obtained to
provide functionality, and settings can restrict these benefits.
Therefore, even informed users would trade some data, while
actively protecting other details.
Persuasion. Through our final questions, we asked par-
ticipants what would encourage protection. Users named a
range of scenarios, from negative media reports to apps being
hacked. A common theme was if the participant acquired a
high-profile job. This would increase the sensitivity of watch
data, and hence encourage greater protection. Individuals also
claimed they would act if abroad, especially if that country
was dangerous. However, one participant did go overseas, and
reported not increasing their protection. Privacy settings were
rarely mentioned as an impediment. As before, this suggests
that threat components have greater influence on smartwatches.
Further approaches. The largest issues appear to be per-
ceived severity, perceived vulnerability and perceived rewards.
Severity is challenging to magnify, since many participants had
a nuanced view. Individuals did not oppose all sharing, though
perceptions might change after recent privacy controversies
(Glenday, 2018). To highlight the risk from their data, we
could demonstrate inference techniques through online videos.
Our privacy game contextualised challenges around real-
life behaviour. This sought to make the issue salient to each
individual. After treatment participants learned of their vulner-
ability, many chose to adjust their settings. Since risk appears
influential, future tools could analyse user permissions. Based
on the restrictions applied to each app, a risk exposure could
be calculated. By allowing individuals to compare their scores,
protection might be incentivised.
Rewards are challenging to counter, since apps do provide
convenient features. However, this does not mean that data has
to be sacrificed. Mocking frameworks have been successful in
faking smartphone metrics (Beresford, Rice, Skehin, & Sohan,
2011). Since our watches run on an Android environment,
similar tools might be possible. When an app then requires
a location, a coarse position could be given. In this manner,
functionality could be received while protecting data.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
Summary. We outline the development of the first privacy-
themed smartwatch game. It was designed through Learning
Science principles and evaluated through a 52-day longitudinal
study. Our treatment group, who played the game, began
taking greater action to protect their privacy. Indeed, their
usage of screen locks significantly increased after gameplay.
The control group, who used a generic version, continued to
do little. Indeed, 80% of these users failed to adjust a single
setting. Since treatment concerns became more nuanced after
gameplay, opinions appeared to realign with behaviour.
By dissecting interviews through Protection Motivation The-
ory, we explored smartwatch privacy rationale. Participants
appeared most influenced by three factors: sensitivity, salience
and convenience. A person will not invest effort unless their
data is deemed valuable. Even if they do desire protection,
privacy can be easily overlooked. Finally, informed users
might sacrifice data for convenience. However, they can only
make a considered choice if they understand the risks. Since
smartwatch games appear to encourage protection, they should
be considered as a complement to awareness campaigns.
Implications. Our findings are in line with existing re-
search. As highlighted above, even informed users might
trade their data for functionality. This supports the concept
of Privacy Calculus, where the benefits and risks of disclosure
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are compared (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). However, until
individuals gain an understanding of the topic, they cannot
judge the risk fairly (Slovic, 1987). Indeed, as highlighted by
Acquisti et al. (2015), the Privacy Paradox “is also affected
by misperceptions of those costs and benefits, as well as
social norms, emotions, and heuristics”. When people lack
knowledge of a matter, they tend to overestimate the advan-
tages (Go´mez-Barroso, Feijo´o, & Martı´nez-Martı´nez, 2018).
Therefore, since baseline privacy knowledge tends to be low
(Bashir, Hayes, Lambert, & Kesan, 2015), we must support
users to make informed protective decisions. We believe this
has been achieved through the use of educational games.
As suggested by Hallam and Zanella (2017), privacy issues
became more pertinent after we increased their salience.
Permanence. Although interventions might adjust be-
haviour, they can lose efficacy once their salience decreases.
As participants forget about our educational game, they might
decrease their protective behaviour. We sought to influence the
availability heuristic as a means of increasing risk perception
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, we recognise that as
salience reduces, so does the perceived likelihood of threats.
However, our game also aimed to enhance individuals’ self-
efficacy. Even if participants lack the immediate desire to
guard their data, it is valuable that they know how. Our
posttest interviews showed that even the treatment participants
who avoided protection (e.g., Participant C) could demonstrate
the usage of privacy settings. Hence, although salience might
decrease over the longer-term, protective knowledge should
be retained. This was suggested in our posttest results, where
behaviour did not revert even weeks after gameplay.
Limitations. We are transparent in the fact that our study
possesses several limitations. Firstly, we only evaluated a
sample size of 10 participants. As a result, we drew no
conclusions over whether privacy concerns vary by culture.
We were constrained, since new watches required monitoring
over a consistent period. While we would have preferred a
larger group, we supported our quantitative findings with a
rich qualitative analysis. Secondly, our longitudinal study only
spanned a period of two months. In this case, we were limited
by the term lengths of our university. However, the duration
was in excess of many two-stage studies, which impose a gap
of one week (Albayram, Khan, & Jensen, 2017; Wiedenbeck,
Waters, Birget, Brodskiy, & Memon, 2005; DeWitt & Kuljis,
2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2009). To test retention further,
we plan to monitor new participants over a longer period.
Thirdly, our gameplay questionnaire suggested that only 60%
of users enjoyed the games. Therefore, even if the privacy app
did prove beneficial, further enhancements might be required
to support intrinsic motivation. Finally, by targeting Android
devices, we neglected the Apple Watch environment. This is a
distinct ecosystem, albeit one which may be less amenable to
analysis (Tracy, 2012). In future research, we seek to compare
behaviour by developing Apple games.
Further work. We finally discuss opportunities for further
work. It would be interesting to explore smartwatch purchases.
Wearables may present risks, but it is unclear whether this
fact is ever considered. By comparing Wear OS users to other
populations, we could analyse how expectations vary. Smart-
watch games appear to be effective in encouraging protection.
However, other connected devices, such as Smart TVs, also
present privacy issues (Ghiglieri, Volkamer, & Renaud, 2017).
Our design principles are transferable, and TV games might
highlight the risk.
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APPENDIX
TABLE VII
CONCERN QUESTIONNAIRE: PRIVACY QUESTIONS IN BOLD
# Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statements.
Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.
1 “I find the smartwatch useful.”
2 “I use a wide range of features on the smartwatch.”
3 “I would experience inconvenience if I didn’t use the
smartwatch.”
4 “It is possible for smartwatch apps to simplify common tasks.”
5 “It is possible for smartwatch apps to access personal data.”
6 “It is possible for smartwatch apps to drain the battery.”
7 “I have a strong understanding of smartwatch notification
features.”
8 “I have a strong understanding of smartwatch privacy
features.”
9 It is important you remain attentive. Indicate that you are by
marking X in the Strongly Disagree box.
10 “I have a strong understanding of smartwatch display features.”
11 “There is a realistic chance of smartwatches being lost or
stolen.”
12 “If I didn’t configure my settings, my apps might drain my
battery.”
13 “If I didn’t configure my settings, my apps might place my
data at risk.”
14 “If I didn’t configure my settings, my apps might slow down
my watch.”
# Indicate your responses from Indifferent to Very Concerned.
Also provide your qualitative rationale.
15 How would you feel if Google (the developer of Android)
changed your smartwatch’s default font size?
16 How would you feel if app companies could track your
precise current location?
17 Imagine a software update changed your smartwatch’s font size.
How would you feel if the text was made much smaller than it
was before?
18 How would you feel if app companies could read your
personal data from your smartwatch?
19 Imagine your smartwatch was lost or stolen. How would you
feel if a random stranger could read your data?
20 How would you feel if Google (the developer of Android)
changed your smartwatch’s default alarm volume?
21 Imagine your smartwatch was lost or stolen. How would you
feel if a random stranger could use your apps as you?
22 Imagine a software update changed your smartwatch’s alarm
volume. How would you feel if the alarm volume was set much
quieter than it was before?
23 How would you feel if app companies could share your
personal data with other companies?
24 How would you feel if Google (the developer of Android)
changed your smartwatch’s default screen brightness?
25 How would you feel if app companies could share your
precise movements with other companies?
26 Imagine a software update changed your smartwatch’s screen
brightness. How would you feel if the brightness was set much
lower than it was before?
TABLE VIII
POSTTEST INTERVIEW QUESTIONS:
ALL QUESTIONS SOLICIT OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES
# Introductory Questions
1 What was your experience in wearing the smartwatch?
2 Why did you choose to participate in the study?
3 Do you feel the background StudyService app affected your
behaviour? Why?
4 Would you purchase your own smartwatch? Why?
5 Do you feel you learned anything new as the study progressed?
If so, what?
# Privacy Awareness and Knowledge Questions
6 How likely do you believe the chance of companies accessing
your watch’s data? Why?
7 How likely do you believe the chance of someone’s smartwatch
being lost or stolen? Why?
8 How privacy-conscious do you generally consider yourself to
be? Why?
9 How do you think your smartwatch’s data could be accessed by
companies or other people?
10 Imagine your smartwatch settings were changed back to their
defaults. If you wanted to, what could you do to protect your
smartwatch’s data? Why?
11 Imagine your smartwatch settings were changed back to their
defaults. If you wanted to prevent apps from tracking your
location, what could you do? Why?
12 Imagine your smartwatch settings were changed back to their
defaults. If you wanted to stop apps from reading your personal
data, what could you do? Why?
13 Imagine your smartwatch settings were changed back to their
defaults. If you wanted to limit watch access in case of loss or
theft, what could you do? Why?
14 Could you please show me, and explain aloud, how to disable
GPS on your smartwatch?
15 Could you please show me, and explain aloud, how to change
the permissions for a smartwatch app?
16 Could you please show me, and explain aloud, how to enable a
screen lock on your smartwatch?
# Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) Questions
17 On a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high), how serious do you feel
the action of your smartwatch data being accessed by a company
is? Why?
18 How effective do you think smartwatch settings can be in
protecting your device’s data? Why?
19 How able do you feel you are to protect your smartwatch’s data?
Why?
20 Do you feel you receive benefits from using data-accessing
apps? If so, what?
21 How much effort do you feel it is to protect your smartwatch’s
data? Why?
# Privacy Paradox Questions
22 We have discussed the use of tools which protect your smart-
watch’s privacy. Can you think of any techniques or circum-
stances that would lead you to use these tools more often?
23 Most of us claim to be concerned about our privacy. However,
most of us also fail to fully protect ourselves. This contrast is
known as the Privacy Paradox. Why do you think this situation
might occur?
24 You have indicated that you are concerned about your smart-
watch’s data being accessed. However, on occasions, you didn’t
use settings to protect that data. Why do you feel this was the
case?
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TABLE IX
GAME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
# Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statements.
Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.
1 “I found the smartwatch game to be enjoyable.”
2 “I found the smartwatch game to be usable.”
3 “I found the smartwatch game to be educational.”
4 “I found the challenges in the smartwatch game to be easy.”
# Qualitative Opinions
1 What did you like most about the smartwatch game? Why?
2 What did you like least about the smartwatch game? Why?
3 What about the game would you like to see improved? Why?
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